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THE IMPACT OF INFLATION TARGETING ON UNEMPLOYMENT 
IN DEVELOPING AND EMERGING ECONOMIES
∗ 
Jose Angelo Divino
 ∗∗  
ABSTRACT 
Several countries around the world have adopted the inflation targeting regime for monetary 
policy. Despite the growing literature on the issue, it is not clear whether developing and 
emerging countries can improve their economic performance by adopting inflation targeting. 
This working paper examines the extent to which macroeconomic policies anchored to 
inflation targeting affect unemployment, economic growth and the output gap. The results 
show that inflation targeting causes no harm to employment in developing and emerging 
countries. On the contrary, it might reduce average unemployment and narrow the output 
gap. Given that the change in regime must be accompanied by institutional and economic 
reforms to fiscal and exchange rate policies, targeters might be better off than non-targeters. 
Hence there is no apparent reason to condemn the adoption of the inflation targeting regime 
by developing and emerging countries. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Several countries around the world have adopted the inflation targeting monetary policy 
regime. The economic benefits of such a policy have been widely investigated in the recent 
literature. For developed countries, recent studies have generally reported that adoption  
of inflation targeting is associated with significant gains in terms of a decline in both average 
inflation and its volatility, a narrowing of the output gap, an increase in economic growth,  
and a lessening of the impacts of supply shocks on prices and economic activity. Usually, the 
studies compare targeting countries to non-targeters countries and offer empirical evidence 
that the targeters exhibited a better economic performance after the change in monetary 
policy. The improvements are relative to both the pre-targeting period and to non-targeting 
countries. Empirical evidence provided by Corbo et al. (2002), Mishkin and Schimidt-Hebbel 
(2007), Neumann and von Hagen (2001), and Gonçalves and Salles (forthcoming) support this 
claim. The only exception in the literature might be Ball and Sheridan (2005), who found no 
convincing evidence of a significant change in economic performance between targeters and 
non-targeters among developed countries.  
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Inspired by the successful experience of developed countries, several developing and 
emerging countries have also adopted inflation targeting for monetary policy. The reasons 
usually given to justify adoption of this policy regime include transparency in monetary policy, 
the reduction of economic uncertainty because of the Central Bank’s commitment to the 
target inflation rate, the credibility of monetary policy over time, and implementation of the 
institutional and economic reforms required by the new regime. For developing and emerging 
countries, however, the empirical evidence of the economic benefits of inflation targeting 
remains unclear. Gonçalves and Salles (forthcoming), for instance, argue that countries on the 
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) that adopted inflation targeting were able to reduce the 
average rate of inflation and its volatility but were not able to improve economic growth 
relative to EMBI countries that had not adopted inflation targeting. Corbo et al. (2002), on the 
other hand, claim that the economic performance of targeters was better than that of non-
targeters among developed and emerging countries.  
An inflation targeting regime uses the nominal interest rate as a policy instrument and the 
transmission channel is aggregate demand. The general rule is to increase the nominal interest 
rate more than proportionally to any expected rise in the inflation rate above the target, so 
that the real interest rate increases. The higher real interest rate reduces aggregate demand 
and slows economic activity. This forces firms to lower prices in order to avoid excess supply, 
mitigating inflationary pressures in the economy. It is theoretically and empirically recognised 
that there is a tradeoff between stabilising inflation and stabilising the output gap, defined as 
the percentage deviation of effective output from the potential output of the economy. 
Optimally, the central bank chooses an interest rate that is able to keep inflation as close as 
possible to the announced target rate without increasing the economy’s output gap by much.1 
On the real side of the economy, the consequences of an inflation targeting regime might 
be twofold, especially for developing and emerging countries that already face structural 
deficiencies and that have long sought price stability. Historically, for instance, those countries 
are characterised by higher unemployment rates than rates in developed countries. In this 
case, the simple adoption of a monetary policy regime that will explicitly reduce economic 
activity in order to attain price stability might increase existing distortions and have 
undesirable consequences in the labour market. Inflation might successfully be brought close 
to the target rate, but at a high cost in terms of unemployment, the output gap and economic 
growth. On the other hand, the price stability achieved by a successful inflation targeting 
regime might lessen uncertainty and create a favourable economic environment for 
investment, consumption and growth. 
This working paper will investigate the extent to which macroeconomic policies anchored 
to inflation targeting affect unemployment, economic growth and the output gap. If job 
creation is constrained by supply-side problems, should countries implement a macroeconomic 
policy that assumes excessive domestic aggregate demand? Will raising interest rates to curb 
inflation and the tightening of monetary policies increase unemployment? What are the 
alternative policies? The study will address these issues using a cross-section analysis of 
developing and emerging countries. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly describes the empirical 
literature that discusses the consequences of adopting an inflation targeting regime. Section 3 
presents the econometric model used in the estimations. Section 4 describes the samples of 
countries and the period of analysis. The results are presented and analyzed in Section 5. 
Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks and policy recommendations.  Working Paper  3 
 
 
2  RELATED LITERATURE 
The recent literature has made much effort to address the issue of whether inflation targeting 
affects price stability and economic performance. Mishkin (2004) provides critical arguments 
for the adoption of inflation targeting by emerging countries. He maintains that the 
differences between advanced and emerging countries require that the latter take much 
greater care when adopting an inflation targeting regime. Specifically, emerging countries 
have weak fiscal institutions, weak financial institutions (including government prudential 
regulation and supervision), monetary institutions with limited credibility, currency 
substitution and liability dollarisation, and vulnerability to sudden stops of capital inflows.  
To have a successful inflation targeting regime, emerging countries should bear in mind  
that it requires a sequence of measures, including the public announcement of medium-term 
numerical targets for inflation; an institutional commitment to price stability as the primary 
goal of monetary policy, to which other goals are subordinated; an information-inclusive 
strategy in which many variables—not just monetary aggregates or the exchange rate—are 
used to determine the setting of policy instruments; greater transparency of the monetary 
policy strategy through communication with the public and the markets about the plans, 
objectives and decisions of the monetary authorities; and greater accountability on the part of 
the central bank in attaining its inflation objectives. Failure to meet those requirements might 
undermine a successful transition to the inflation targeting regime. 
There are two crucial issues in implementing the regime. The first is responsible 
management of fiscal policy, because of all the implications of the fiscal theory of the price 
level—according to which irresponsible fiscal policy puts pressure on the monetary authority 
to monetise the debt (Woodford, 1994 and 1995). The second is the “fear of floating” the 
exchange rate (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) because of the belief that exchange rate depreciation 
would increase the prices of imported final goods and raise demand for exports, resulting in 
higher domestic inflation by means of the exchange rate pass-through. Concerns about 
exchange rate stability would compromise the credibility of price stability, which should be  
the main goal of the inflation targeting regime. If adequate attention is paid to those fragilities, 
however, Mishkin (2004) argues that the inflation targeting regime can help improve the 
macroeconomic performance of emerging countries because the change in the monetary 
policy regime does not come unaccompanied. It requires several institutional and economic 
reforms that positively affect the country as a whole. 
Corbo et al. (2002) examine whether inflation targeting makes a difference. They compare 
targeter countries with non-targeters in terms of success in meeting target values, sacrifice 
ratios and output volatility. They also analyze whether inflation targeting improves the ability 
to predict inflation, changes the country’s macroeconomic performance in terms of inflation 
and the output gap, and affects the degree of aversion to inflation relative to  non-targeters. 
The sample includes both developed and emerging countries in the period 1980–1999. They 
answer these question in the affirmative, finding that inflation targeters were very successful in 
meeting target values; output sacrifice ratios were lower among targeters than non-targeters; 
the volatility of industrial production was lower for targeters; forecast errors were smaller for 
targeters; and inflation aversion was on average not statistically different between targeters 
and non-targeters. In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that inflation targeting does make 
a difference to a country’s price stability. 4  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
For EMBI countries,2 Gonçalves and Salles (forthcoming) argue that inflation targeting has 
proven to benefit economic performance: targeters experienced a greater fall in inflation and 
in the volatility of economic growth than non-targeters. In addition, inflation targeting did not 
harm economic growth. Thus the authors suggest that the adoption of inflation targeting by 
EMBI countries did make a positive difference to economic performance. 
Mishkin and Schimidt-Hebbel (2007) provide further empirical evidence as to whether 
inflation targeting makes a difference. Their sample includes eight industrial countries  
and 13 emerging economies that were inflation targeters in late 2004. The control group 
consists of 13 industrial non-targeter countries. The empirical evidence is from panel data 
estimations, panel vector autoregressive models and panel impulse responses. The authors 
find support for the idea that targeters experienced a better inflation performance, a 
substantial improvement in the efficiency of monetary policy, and a better observed 
macroeconomic performance than non-targeters. In addition, emerging economies recorded  
a much greater improvement following the adoption of inflation targeting than did industrial 
countries. The authors argue that inflation targeting seems to help countries to achieve lower 
inflation in the long run, to respond better to oil price and exchange rate shocks, to strengthen 
monetary policy independence, to improve monetary policy efficiency, and to secure inflation 
rates that are closer to target levels. They conclude that inflation targeting seems to be the 
natural monetary regime choice, especially for emerging market economies, where the gains 
from inflation targeting are found to be the largest. 
Neumann and Von Hagen (2001) consider whether inflation targeting matters for 
developed countries. They analyzed six inflation targeting countries and three non-targeters. 
The pre-inflation targeting period was 1978–1992 and the post-targeting period was 1993–
2001. The empirical evidence considered the volatility of inflation, output gaps and interest 
rates. They estimated central banks’ reaction functions in the form of Taylor rules, unrestricted 
vector autoregressions (VARs), and policy reactions to large supply shocks generated by the  
oil price hikes of 1978/79 and 1998/99. They conclude that inflation targeting matters because 
targeters have reduced inflation to low levels and curbed the volatility of inflation and interest 
rates. Additionally, targeting has helped previously high-inflation countries to gain monetary 
policy credibility.  
Fraga, Goldfajn and Minella (2003) compare the relative performance of developed  
and emerging countries that had adopted inflation targeting by the end of 2002. They argue 
that the volatility of output, inflation, the interest rate and the exchange rate was higher in 
emerging economies than in developed countries. Among the reasons given for this less 
favourable tradeoff are the process of building credibility, the need to lower inflation levels, 
dominance issues (fiscal, monetary or external), and the stronger effect of supply shocks in 
emerging targeting countries. To improve the performance of the inflation targeting regime, 
the authors recommend that emerging economies seek high levels of communication  
and transparency, treat target bands mainly as communication devices, establish a 
methodology to calculate the convergence path following a shock (adjusted targets),  
and better International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality under inflation targeting. 
A contrast to the previous findings is offered by Ball and Sheridan (2005). They investigate 
whether inflation targeting improves economic performance, as measured by the behaviour  
of inflation, output and interest rates, for seven countries of the Organisation for Economic Working Paper  5 
 
 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that adopted inflation targeting in the early 1990s and 
13 that did not. Their major finding suggests that, after controlling for regression to the mean, 
there is no evidence that inflation targeting improves economic performance. That is because 
after the early 1990s, the economic performance of both groups of countries improved in 
many dimensions. It might be that average inflation declined more for targeters than non-
targeters. But those differences are explained by regression to the mean, given that targeters 
performed worse than non-targeters in the pre-targeting period. These results, however, 
should not be taken as an argument against inflation targeting, since the authors did not  
find that the policy regime caused any harm to the economy. It is just a counter-argument  
to the panacea that inflation targeting has recently come to be seen in several countries. 
This working paper contributes to the previous literature by analyzing the consequences 
for developing and emerging countries of adopting the inflation targeting regime. Both 
targeters and non-targeters are developing and emerging countries for which recent data 
were available. The study examines whether targeters have been able to improve their 
economic performance in terms of unemployment, economic growth and the output  
gap relative to non-targeters and to the pre-targeting period.  
3  ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
The basic econometric model is drawn from Ball and Sheridan (2005). The idea is to use the 
difference-in-difference approach to compare the performance of targeting and non-targeting 
countries before and after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. The focus of interest is 
to verify whether inflation targeting countries were able to improve their economic performance 
in terms of reducing the unemployment rate, narrowing the output gap and increasing 
economic growth. The comparison is made before and after the adoption of the policy  
regime and in relation to other countries that did not adopt the regime during the period. 
Define the variable Yi as the country i average value of a given variable, say the 
unemployment rate, the output gap or economic growth during some period, and Vi as the 
volatility of one of those variables during the same period. For each country of the sample, Yi 
and Vi are calculated before and after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. For non-
targeting countries, the breaking point is given by the average starting period among 
countries that adopted the inflation targeting regime.3  
To compare economic performance across countries in the recent period, taking non-
targeters as the control group, Ball and Sheridan (2005) proposed the estimation of the 
following OLS regressions:4 
   ,      ,                  (1) 
 
   ,      ,                  (2) 
 
where    ,  is country i average value of Yt in the post-inflation targeting period,    ,  is country i 
average value of Yt in the pre-inflation targeting period,     is a dummy variable that assumes 6  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
value 1 if country i is inflation targeting and 0 otherwise. In the same fashion,    ,  is country i 
volatility of Yt in the post-inflation targeting period,   ,  is country i volatility of Yt in the pre-
inflation targeting period. The residuals,    and    are assumed to be homoscedastic.  
The major problem with the estimation of (1) and (2) is that they suffer from regression  
to the mean. The coefficients   and  , which capture the effects of targeting on the left-hand 
side variables, are downward biased, leading to the false conclusion that inflation-targeting 
countries had performed better than non-targeting ones. As argued by Ball and Sheridan 
(2005), poor performers in the first period tend to improve more in the second period than 
good performers in the first period. Given that, in general, it is the bad performers that decide 
to change regime, estimated coefficients   and   tend to be negative and statistically 
significant, leading to the erroneous conclusion that a country would be better off by adopting 
the inflation targeting regime.  
To account for the regression to the mean problem, Ball and Sheridan (2005) suggested 
including the initial value of the left-hand variable as a regressor. In this case, the dummy 
variable coefficient would measure the relative change in performance for targeting countries, 
given that the initial performance of all countries is controlled for. Thus, the previous 
regressions become: 
   ,      ,                   ,           (3) 
 
   ,      ,                   ,           (4) 
 
However, regressions (3) and (4) are still missing the potential effect of a poor 
performance in the first period on the country’s decision of choosing to target inflation in  
the second period. That is, the economic performance in the initial period might be different 
across targeters and non-targeters and so might not have the same impact across countries on 
the decision to change regime. To control for this effect, we include a multiplicative dummy 
variable in regressions (3) and (4). Thus, the estimated regressions are given by: 
     ,      ,                   ,            ,           (5) 
 
   ,      ,                   ,           ,           (6) 
 
where   and   are coefficients on the multiplicative dummy variables. If the initial economic 
performance of targeters and non-targeters is different and affects the country’s decision to 
move toward targeting inflation, they should be statistically significant.  Working Paper  7 
 
 
4  DATA AND SAMPLES 
We collected annual data for developing and emerging countries on unemployment, 
economic growth and real GDP, which was used to estimate the output gap, from 1985 to 
2005 for the first two variables and from 1985 to 2006 for the latter two. The sources of the 
data were the Labour Statistics Database (Laborsta) of the International Labour Organisation 
(for unemployment) and the World Bank (for economic growth, GDP and the consumer price 
index). The output gap, for all countries, was computed as the percentage deviation of real 
GDP from potential output, as predicted by a linear trend. 
The samples of countries also changed across variables. They are presented in Table 1. 
Specifically, we were able to acquire data on unemployment for 25 countries, seven of which 
were inflation targeters by the end of the period. For economic growth and the output gap, 
our sample consisted of 64 countries, 10 of which were inflation targeters. We also built a third 
sample including only common countries across all three variables, yielding 16 countries of 
which six were inflation targeters.  
As in Bernanke et al. (1999) and Sheater et al. (2000), we date the beginning of the 
targeting period as the year when the inflation targeting regime was first announced. As a 
result, the starting point of the targeting regime ranged from 1990 to 2002. Some countries 
that moved to inflation targeting in 2005 and 2006 were regarded as non-targeters because of 
the closeness with the end of the sample.5 For the non-targeting countries, the post-inflation 
targeting period started in 1997, defined by the simple mean of starting dates across targeting 
countries.6 The results were not sensitive to changes in this breaking point. 
For the inflation targeting countries, Table 1 also shows the date when the regime was 
adopted and the percentage value of the target rate when the regime was first announced.  
An updated list of current inflation targeting countries is presented in Table 2. It is worth 
noting that some countries might be classified as non-constant targeters countries, since  
they allow the targeting rate to change over time. This is the case of Turkey and Indonesia, for 
instance, which adopted inflation targeting in 2005 and 2006, respectively. For the sake of this 
study, however, those countries are not distinguished from those that have maintained a 
constant targeting rate over time. 
   8  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
TABLE 1 
Targeting and Non-Targeting Developing and Emerging Countries 
SAMPLE 1 (T=7; N=18)    SAMPLE 3 (T=10; N=54) 
Variable: Unemployment    Variables: Economic Growth and Output Gap 
Targeting countries  Date of 
adoption  Target value   Targeting countries  Date of 
adoption  Target value
Brazil 1999  4½%(±2%)   Brazil 1999  4½%(±2%)
Chile 1990  2-4%   Chile 1990  2-4%
Colombia 1999  2-4%   Colombia 1999  2-4%
Israel 1992  1-3%   Hungary  2001  3%(±1%)
Korea 2002  4-5%   Israel  1992  1-3%
Philippines 1998  3%(±1%)   Mexico  1999  3%
Thailand 2000  0-3½%   Peru  2002  2%(±1%)
Non-targeting countries   Philippines  2002  4-5%
Albania Pakistan    South  Africa  2000  3-6%
Argentina Panama    Thailand  2000  0-3½%
China Puerto  Rico    Non-targeting countries 
Costa Rica  San Marino    Algeria  Jordan   
Cyprus  Singapore    Antigua and Barbuda  Kiribati   
Hong Kong  Taiwan    Argentina  Lesotho   
Jamaica  Trinidad and Tobago    Belize  Macao, China 
Malaysia Uruguay    Bhutan  Malaysia   
Malta Venezuela    Bolivia  Malta   
       Botswana  Marshall  Islands 
       Brunei  Darussalam  Mauritius   
       Bulgaria  Morocco   
SAMPLE 2 (T=6; N=10)   Cameroon  Namibia   
Variables: Unemployment, Economic Growth, and 





Targeting countries  Date of 





Brazil 1999  4½%(±2%)   Dominica  Seychelles 
Chile 1990  2-4%   Dominican  Republic  Singapore 
Colombia 1999  2-4%   Ecuador  Sri  Lanka 
Israel  1992  1-3%   Egypt  St. Kitts and Nevis 
Philippines  1998  3%(±1%)   El Salvador  St. Lucia 
Thailand 2000  0-3½%   Gabon  Suriname 
Non-targeting countries   Grenada  Swaziland 
Argentina Malaysia    Guatemala  Syria 
China Malta    Guyana  Tonga 
Costa Rica  Panama    Honduras  Trinidad and Tobago 
Cyprus  Singapore    Hong Kong, China  Tunisia 
Jamaica  Trinidad and Tobago    Indonesia  Turkey 
     Jamaica  Vanuatu   
Source of targeting countries: International Monetary Fund (IMF). 




Inflation Targeting Countries 
 
Country  Date of adoption  Targeting value 
Developed    
1  Australia 1993  2-3% 
2  Canada 1991  1-3%   
3  New Zealand  1990  1-3% 
4  Norway 2001 2½% 
5  Sweden 1993  2%  (±1%) 
6  Switzerland 2000  0-2% 
7  United Kingdom  1992  2% 
Developing/Emerging    
8  Brazil 1999  4½%  (±2%) 
9  Chile 1990  2-4% 
10  Colombia 1999  2-4% 
11  Czech Republic  1998  3% (±1%) 
12  Ghana 2007  0-10% 
13  Hungary 2001  3%  (±1%) 
14  Iceland 2001  2½%  (±1½%) 
15  Indonesia 2005  6%  (±1%) 
16  Israel 1992  1-3% 
17  Mexico 1999  3% 
18  Peru 2002  2%  (±1%) 
19  Philippines 2002  4-5% 
20  Poland 1998  2½%  (±1%) 
21  Romania 2005  4%  (±1%) 
22  Slovakia 2005  0-2% 
23  South Africa  2000  3-6% 
24  South Korea  1998  3% (±1%) 
25  Thailand 2000  0-3½% 
26  Turkey 2006  4%  (±2%) 
Source: IMF, Monetary Bulletin, 2007-2. 
5  RESULTS 
5.1  MEAN AND VOLATILITY 
Before discussing the estimation results, it is informative to look at the differences in mean and 
volatility of the unemployment, economic growth and output gap variables before and after 
the adoption of the targeting regime and across targeters and non-targeters. We will start  
with the mean of those variables. The results are given in Table 3.  
   10  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
TABLE 3 
Mean and Percentage Variation of the Variables 
 Targeters  (T)  Non-targeters (N)  Variation (T-N in %)
Unemployment (I)  7.50  7.98  -6.01 
Unemployment (F)  9.40  8.57  9.69 
Variation (F-I in %)  25.27  7.33   
      
Growth rate (I)  3.44  3.15  9.20 
Growth rate (F)  4.27  4.11  3.88 
Variation (F-I in %)  24.09  30.45   
      
Output gap (I)  0.17 0.32  -45.18 
Output gap (F)  -1.62  -0.42  289.30 
Variation (F-I in %)  -1036.93  -231.95    
Note: (I) stands for the pre-targeting period; (F) stands for the post-targeting period. 
 
The percent changes in average unemployment before and after targeting were 25.27  
per cent and 7.33 per cent for targeters and non-targeters, respectively. Thus both groups of 
countries experienced a rise in unemployment between the two periods, but the increase was 
much more pronounced for targeting countries. Comparing targeters and non-targeters, in the 
pre-targeting period the average unemployment rate was lower by 6.01 per cent for targeters. 
In the post-targeting period, however, the difference became positive, meaning a higher 
average unemployment rate of 9.69 per cent for targeting countries. Thus the average 
unemployment rate rose for both groups of countries, but it increased relatively more for 
targeters than for non-targeters.  
A similar conclusion arises from the comparison of average economic growth between 
periods and across countries. For the targeters, there was a 24.09 per cent increase in the 
average rate of growth after the adoption of inflation targeting. For the non-targeters, the 
increase was even higher at 30.45 per cent. Comparing the relative performance of the two 
groups within each period, average economic growth was slightly higher for the targeters. 
Before the targeting regime, the difference was 9.2 per cent; after the adoption of inflation 
targeting it fell to 3.88 per cent. Thus the average rate of growth was higher for targeters in 
both periods, but the positive difference decreased in the latter one. 
For the output gap, the scenario is quite different. For both groups of countries, the 
positive output gap of the first period became negative after the adoption of inflation 
targeting. However, the fall was considerably higher for targeting countries. Across the groups 
of countries in the same period, the difference changed from -45.18 per cent to 289.30 per cent 
in favour of non-targeters. The average output gap became negative after the inflation 
targeting regime, but more negative for the targeters than for the non-targeters.  
Moving to the volatility of unemployment, economic growth and the output gap, the 
results are given in Table 4. The volatility of the unemployment rate declined between 
periods for both groups of countries. But the decline was higher for the non-targeters  
(-62.57 per cent) than for the targeters (-22.61 per cent). Comparing the two groups within  
a given period, the non-targeters had higher average volatility, by 39.68 per cent, in the  
pre-targeting period and a lower one, by 24.72 per cent, in the post-targeting period.  
Thus, combined with the results of Table 3, the unemployment rate had a lower mean  




Volatility and Percentage Variation of the Variables 
 Targeters  (T)  Non-targeters (N)  Variation (T-N in %)
Unemployment (I)  3.82  6.33  -39.68 
Unemployment (F)  2.96  2.37  24.72 
Variation (F-I in %)  -22.61  -62.57   
      
Growth rate (I)  15.07  31.37  -51.95 
Growth rate (F)  4.27  13.62  -68.63 
Variation (F-I in %)  -71.65  -56.58   
      
Output gap (I)  58.19 73.83  -21.19 
Output gap (F)  47.84  52.02  -8.03 
Variation (F-I in %)  -17.78  -29.54    
Note: (I) stands for the pre-targeting period; (F) stands for the post-targeting period. 
 
Looking at the relative performance in terms of economic growth, both groups of 
countries were able to reduce the volatility of the growth rate between the two periods. 
Targeters reduced it by 71.65 per cent and non-targeters by 56.58 per cent. In both periods,  
the average volatility of the growth rate was smaller for the targeting countries. In the pre-
targeting period it was smaller by 51.95 per cent and in the post-targeting period by 68.63  
per cent. Thus targeting countries succeeded in maintaining a lower volatility of economic 
growth than non-targeting countries.  
An equivalent result, albeit at smaller magnitudes, was observed for relative performance 
in terms of the output gap. Both groups of countries reduced output gap volatility between 
periods. Within a given period, volatility was smaller for targeting countries. Nonetheless,  
the difference decreased substantially after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime.  
As a partial conclusion, from Tables 3 and 4 it is not clear whether the adoption of the 
inflation targeting regime improved the economic performance of targeters in terms of a lower 
unemployment rate, higher economic growth, and a narrower output gap than non-targeters. 
In addition to the closeness of the calculated values for the average and volatility of the three 
variables, there is the potential problem of regression to mean. The estimations of the next 
section shed new light on the question.  
5.2  ESTIMATED INFLATION TARGETING REGRESSIONS 
5.2.1  Unemployment 
We begin by analyzing the results of regressions for the average unemployment rate. Figure 1 
shows averages of the unemployment rate for targeters and non-targeters before and after the 
adoption of the targeting regime. It is not clear whether countries with a poor performance in 
terms of high average unemployment have been those that moved to the inflation targeting 
regime. In fact, there are countries with both low and high initial-period average unemployment 
that became targeters in the second period, and others that remained as non-targeters. Thus 
there is no clear evidence of regression to the mean in the estimations of regressions (1) and (2) 
for unemployment rate differentials. This primary evidence will be confirmed by the estimated 
regressions that control for potential regression to the mean problem. 12  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
FIGURE 1 
Average Unemployment Rate  
 
 
The results of the estimated models for mean unemployment are presented in  
Table 5. Targeting inflation has no significant effect on average unemployment between 
periods and across targeters and non-targeters. Neither constant nor inflation targeting 
dummy variables were statistically significant in the estimated regression for the average 
unemployment differential.  
TABLE 5 
Regressions for Average Unemployment Rate 
Dependent variable: change in average unemployment rate 
  Sample 1    Sample 2 
  eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5    eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5 
Constant 0.59  2.40* 3.29** 2.30 1.55  2.79*
  (0.78)   (1.24)  (1.17) (1.74) (1.64)   (1.34)
IT dummy  1.31  1.20 -4.98* -0.39 2.30  -6.55*
  (1.47) (1.41)   (2.78)   (1.06) (1.66)   (3.18)
Initial mean    -0.23* -0.34** -0.23  -0.38**
     (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.15)   (0.13)
IT*initial mean    0.82**   1.07**
     (0.33)    (0.35)
Heterosc. test  0.80  3.29 2.53 0.42 0.28 1.53
[p-value] [0.3709]  [0.0699] [0.1115] [0.5191] [0.5939] [0.2164]
R-squared 0.0333  0.1594 0.3521  0.1116 0.2444  0.5744
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; 
 *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
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The same conclusion holds for the unemployment volatility regression, whose results are 
reported in Table 6. At the standard 5 per cent significance level, neither the constant nor the 
inflation targeting dummy are statistically significant. As a consequence the R-squared of  
the estimated regressions are close to zero.  
TABLE 6 
Regressions for Volatility of the Unemployment Rate 
Dependent variable: change in volatility of unemployment rate 
  Sample 1    Sample 2 
  eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6    eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6 
Constant 3.10  1.96** 1.99** -3.07* -0.69*** 0.51
  (4.33) (0.74) (0.76)   (1.52)  (0.12)  (1.13)
IT dummy  -3.96*  0.75 0.12 1.83 1.20 1.85
  (2.29) (1.23) (1.96) (2.49) (1.40) (2.54)
Initial mean    -0.94*** -0.94** 0.57  -0.67***
     (0.06)  (0.06) (1.08)   (0.13)
IT*initial mean    0.16   -0.15
   (0.39)     (0.47)
Heterosc. test  3.31  0.50 0.44 0.15 0.01 0.01
[p-value] [0.0687]  [0.4813] [0.5051] [0.7023] [0.9095] [0.9144]
R-squared 0.0217  0.9254 0.9260  0.0374 0.7173  0.7195
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level;  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
See Table 1 for the countries of each sample. 
 
In order to avoid the potential regression to the mean problem, equations (3) and (4) were 
estimated. The results for equation (3) are reported in the third column of Table 5. The 
statistical significance of the inflation targeting dummy did not improve by including the initial 
average value of unemployment in the regression. Initial unemployment and the constant 
were marginally significant at the 10 per cent level. The R-squared coefficient increased to 
about 16 per cent, reflecting the low explanatory power of the regression.  
In the unemployment volatility regression reported in the third column of Table 6, 
however, the improvements were evident. The constant and initial unemployment volatility 
became highly significant variables. Nonetheless, the inflation targeting dummy variable 
retained a negligible level of significance. The R-squared increased to 92.5 per cent, revealing 
the dominant explanatory power of the initial unemployment volatility in the regression.  
Finally, regressions (5) and (6) were estimated under the assumption that initial 
unemployment might have distinct effects on targeters and non-targeters. The different 
effects might be captured by including a multiplicative dummy variable for initial 
unemployment in the regressions. For average unemployment, the multiplicative dummy  
had a high statistical significance and improved the explanatory power of the model. The initial 
average unemployment and the constant became statistically significant at the standard  
5 per cent level. For non-targeters, initial average unemployment had a negative impact on the 
average unemployment differential, while for targeters that impact was positive. The inflation 14  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
targeting dummy variable was significant only at the 10 per cent level. Its negative coefficient 
reveals that targeting countries were able to reduce the unemployment differential in the 
post-targeting period by about 5 per cent relative to non-targeters. The overall significance  
of the model is given by an R-squared of 35.2 per cent and the residuals are homoscedastic.  
In the regression for volatility differential presented in Table 6, the multiplicative dummy 
variable was not significant and did not improve the model’s performance. Only the constant 
and initial volatility of unemployment were statistically different from zero at the 95 per cent 
confidence level. The negative coefficient of the latter variable means that inflation targeting 
countries were able to reduce unemployment volatility in relation to non-targeting ones. 
Neither the level nor the multiplicative inflation targeting dummy variables were statistically 
significant. Thus initial unemployment volatility did not differ across targeting and non-
targeting developing and emerging countries.  
Essentially the same results are obtained by using a reduced sample of just 16 countries, 
labelled sample 2 in Tables 5 to 10, which are common across the unemployment, economic 
growth and output gap variables. The inflation targeting dummy variable is not statistically 
significant in the bivariate regressions for both average and volatility of unemployment 
regressions given by equations (1) and (2).  
When initial unemployment is included in the models, no change is observed in the 
statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. In particular, the additive inflation 
targeting dummy and initial unemployment are not statistically significant. However, for  
the complete regressions, which also include the multiplicative dummy variable, average 
unemployment is marginally affected by the adoption of the inflation targeting regime. The 
additive dummy variable is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level and has a negative 
sign, meaning that targeters were able to reduce average unemployment in the post-targeting 
period. On average, the fall in unemployment was about 6.5 per cent. The unemployment 
volatility, however, was not affected by the targeting regime as neither of the dummy variables 
were statistically significant. 
Thus regressions (5) and (6) were able to capture a marginal effect that adoption of the 
inflation targeting regime had on average unemployment. Targeters reduced average 
unemployment in the post-targeting period relative to non-targeters. This is the case at  
the 10 per cent significance level, but not at the 5 per cent level. 
5.2.2  Economic Growth 
Let us consider first the full sample, which includes data for 64 developing and emerging 
countries described in Table 1 and labelled sample 3 in Tables 7 and 8 below. Figure 2 plots 
pre- and post-targeting average unemployment for the full sample. Estimation of equations  
(1) and (2) reveals that the differentials in average economic growth and in economic growth 
volatility were not affected by the inflation targeting regime. In both equations, the inflation 
targeting dummy variable was not statistically significant at the standard 5 per cent 
significance level. The explanatory power of the models was negligible, as indicated by  
R-squared coefficients close to zero.  








When initial economic growth was included in the previous regressions, the basic scenario 
did not change. The inflation targeting dummy variable was still not statistically significant, 
confirming that the change in regime did not affect either average economic growth or its 
volatility. Initial growth, however, was negative and statistically significant in both regressions. 
This means that a higher initial level of growth is compatible with a smaller differential in 
average economic growth and its volatility between periods and across countries. The  
R-squared coefficients rose from close to zero to 59 per cent and the residuals were 
homoscedastic.  
In this case, it is not relevant to control for the effect of initial economic growth across 
targeters and non-targeters. The multiplicative dummy variable was not statistically significant 
in either the average or volatility regressions. Thus the adoption of the inflation targeting 
regime did not play any role in the countries’ average growth performance. 
Finally, in Tables 7 and 8, regressions (1) to (6) were estimated for the shorter sample 2, 
which includes only countries that are common across all three variables of the analysis.  
As described earlier, in this case, there are 16 countries with six inflation targeters. Essentially, 
the previous conclusions holds in the sense that the adoption of inflation targeting has no 
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TABLE 7 
Regressions for Average Economic Growth 
Dependent variable: change in average economic growth 
  Sample 3    Sample 2 
  eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5    eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5 
Constant 0.78  3.03*** 3.00*** -0.26 -0.77*** 3.71**
  (0.81)   (0.38)  (0.40)  (0.90)  (0.20)  (1.30)
IT dummy  0.05  0.42 0.70 -0.05 -0.32  -1.39
  (0.32) (0.53) (1.07)  (1.47)  (1.05)   (2.91)
Initial  mean   -0.76*** -0.75*** 3.54** -0.80***
     (0.08)  (0.09)  (1.19)   (0.23)
IT*initial mean    -0.08   0.23
     (0.27)   (0.58)
Heterosc. test  0.61  0.59 0.48 2.81 1.46 0.94
[p-value] [0.4354]  [0.4418] [0.4862] [0.0938] [0.2273] [0.3332]
R-squared 0.0149  0.5904 0.5910  0.0001 0.5273  0.5334
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level; 
 *** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
See Table 1 for the countries of each sample. 
 
TABLE 8 
Regressions for Volatility of Economic Growth 
Dependent variable: change in volatility of economic growth 
  Sample 3    Sample 2 
  eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6    eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6 
Constant -7.79**  12.01*** 11.61*** -3.95 4.34  -0.40 
   (3.17)  (3.40)  (3.50)  (3.97) (4.83)   (4.78) 
IT  dummy  -3.01 -8.81 -5.22 -2.62 -4.86 9.00 
   (8.01)   (5.77)  (8.97)  (6.48)  (5.10)  (7.58) 
Initial mean    -0.93*** -0.91*** -0.49 -0.21 
     (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.38)   (0.22) 
IT*initial mean    -0.23   -1.02** 
     (0.44)    (0.42) 
Heterosc. test  2.06  0.90 0.85 0.55 Robust 0.34 
[p-value] [0.1514]  [0.3424] [0.3571] 0.4592   0.5611 
R-squared 0.0023  0.4999 0.5022  0.0116 0.2840  0.5188 
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level;  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
See Table 1 for the countries of each sample. 
 
In the basic regressions, the additive inflation targeting dummy variable was not 
statistically significant. When economic growth in the initial period was added as a regressor, 
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significant only in the average differential regressions. As in the full sample, it had a negative 
sign, meaning that average economic growth in the initial period and the average growth 
differential across periods moved in opposite directions.  
The inclusion of the multiplicative dummy variable left the previous conclusions 
unchanged. The additive inflation targeting dummy was still not statistically significant in 
either model and the multiplicative dummy was statistically significant only in the volatility  
of economic growth regression.  
On the basis of the foregoing empirical evidence, therefore, it can be concluded that 
changing for inflation targeting did not significantly affect developing and emerging 
countries’ economic growth performance. There is no evidence of regression to the mean,  
and dummy variables that control for the change in regime were not statistically significant. 
The only variable that seems to matter for the economic growth differential is the countries’ 
average economic growth in the initial period. 
5.2.3  Output Gap 
In the theoretical models, the output gap emerges as a tradeoff variable when the monetary 
authority seeks to stabilise inflation. In countries that have adopted an inflation targeting 
regime, the consequences of a restrictive monetary policy aiming at price stability should be 
felt in a higher output gap. This claim is investigated here by the estimation of equations  
(1) to (6). A cross-plot of the pre- and post-targeting period output gap is presented in Figure 3. 
FIGURE 3 




In the full sample, the results reported in Tables 9 and 10 indicate that the additive 
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Neither the average output gap nor its volatility are affected by the change in regime when 
other control variables are absent from the regressions.  
TABLE 9 
Regressions for Average Output Gap 
Dependent variable: change in average output gap 
  Sample 3    Sample 2 
  eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5    eq. 1  eq. 3  eq. 5 
Constant -0.73*  -0.06 -0.03 -1.92 -0.05  0.00
   (0.39)   (0.13)  (0.03)  (2.73)  (0.14)  (0.14)
IT dummy  -1.16  -1.05*** -1.14 -0.73 -2.16***  -2.22***
   (1.68)   (0.33)  (0.72)  (0.82)  (0.23)   (0.23)
Initial mean    -2.13*** -2.22*** -2.05***  -2.20***
     (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.06)   (0.13)
IT*initial mean    0.25   0.19
   (0.20)   (0.14)
Heterosc. test  Robust  1.89 Robust Robust 0.00  0.38
[p-value]   [0.1692] [0.9452]  [0.536]
R-squared 0.0159  0.9211 0.9241  0.0483 0.9908  0.9920
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level;  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
See Table 1 for the countries of each sample. Robust means heteroscedaticity consistent standard errors. 
 
TABLE 10 
Regressions for Volatility of Output Gap 
Dependent variable: change in volatility of output gap 
  Sample 3    Sample 2 
  eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6    eq. 2  eq. 4  eq. 6 
Constant -21.81*  30.72*** 29.56*** -8.18 -20.30 -46.38**
   (12.31)   (8.61)  (9.07)  (17.51) (25.04)   (17.60)
IT dummy  5.15  -6.12 30.16 -14.21 -13.27 97.77**
  (31.14) (16.77) (30.54)  (28.60)  (29.18)  (32.50)
Initial mean    -0.71*** -0.70*** 0.18  0.55**
     (0.16)  (0.17) (0.25)   (0.19)
IT*initial mean    -0.62*   -1.71***
     (0.36)    (0.40)
Heterosc. test  1.30  Robust Robust 0.04 2.92  3.54
[p-value] [0.2547]  [0.8354] [0.0874]  [0.0599]
R-squared 0.0004  0.5668 0.5775  0.0173 0.0521 0.6203
Note:  * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level;  
*** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. In parenthesis are the standard deviations.  
See Table 1 for the countries of each sample. Robust means heteroscedaticity consistent standard errors. 
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Including the initial unemployment level as a potential control for regression to the mean 
did not improve the significance of the inflation targeting dummy variable in the volatility 
regression. In the average output gap regression, however, it became negative and statistically 
significant. Thus inflation targeting countries experienced a lower average output gap than 
non-targeting countries after the change in regime. In addition, the initial average output  
gap is also negative and statistically significant. Thus a higher initial output gap is associated 
with a smaller output gap differential in the second period.  
This evidence, however, does not survive controlling for the initial average output gap  
of targeting countries. In the estimated equation (5), the inflation targeting variable became 
statistically not significant, even at the 10 per cent level. The R-squared increased to above 90 
per cent but because of the initial average output gap, which is the only variable statistically 
significant in the estimated regression. In the output gap volatility regression, all variables  
but the inflation targeting dummy are significant at least at the 10 per cent level.  
The results were not changed by moving to sample 2, which considers only common 
countries across the three variables. In the basic regressions (1) and (2) for the average and 
volatility differentials of the output gap, the inflation targeting dummy was not statistically 
significant. Controlling for the initial average and volatility of the output gap in the respective 
regressions improved statistical significance only in the average output gap regression. Both 
the inflation targeting dummy and the initial average output gap were significant at the 5 per 
cent level. This might be interpreted as evidence in favour of the targeters, which were able to 
reduce the average output gap by adopting the inflation targeting regime. 
In this case, as reported in Table 9, the result survives controlling for the initial average 
output gap of targeting countries. The inflation targeting dummy variable retained its negative 
sign, estimated value and statistical significance after adding the new control variable to the 
regression. The initial average output gap has a negative effect on the average output gap 
differential but the effect is smaller in absolute value for the targeters, because of the positive 
estimated coefficient of the multiplicative dummy variable.  
A similar finding is observed in the regression for the output gap volatility differential,  
as reported in Table 10. After controlling for the initial volatility of targeters, the inflation 
targeting dummy variable became statistically significant but with a positive coefficient.  
This means that, after the adoption of the regime, output gap volatility increased in inflation 
targeting countries relative to non-targeting countries. The explanation for this might be that 
targeters tend to adopt a more aggressive monetary policy to bring inflation close to the target 
level. As a result, the tradeoff between inflation and output gap stabilisation is more 
pronounced, making the output gap more volatile in targeters than in non-targeters. Thus, 
while the average output gap seems to be lower for targeters than non-targeters, it is more 
volatile for the former, compromising the potential benefits of the inflation targeting regime 
for the productive sector of the economy.  
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has examined whether inflation targeting countries have been able to improve 
economic performance in terms of the unemployment rate, economic growth and the 
output gap relative to non-targeting countries and also to the pre-targeting period.  
The sample consists of developing and emerging countries for which data were available  20  International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth   
 
in the period starting in 1985. The study applied a difference-in-difference approach to  
address the main question. The estimated models included controls for regression to the 
mean and for distinct effects that initial-period variables might have on a country’s decision 
to adopt inflation targeting. 
Targeting countries, on average, were able to reduce the unemployment rate by about 5 
per cent in the post-targeting period relative to non-targeters. This result is not subject to the 
regression to the mean problem and the effects of initial-period average unemployment are 
controlled for. However, there is no significant difference in the performance of targeters and 
non-targeters in terms of the volatility of unemployment between the two periods. The inflation 
targeting dummy variable was not statistically significant in any of the estimated regressions.  
With respect to economic growth, the results are less favourable for the inflation targeting 
developing and emerging countries. In all the estimated regressions, for both average 
economic growth and its volatility, the inflation targeting dummy variable was not statistically 
significant. Thus adoption of the inflation targeting regime did not help improve the countries’ 
performance in terms of achieving higher average economic growth. 
For the output gap, however, the results provide some support for inflation targeting.  
In the full-sample average output gap regressions, the inflation targeting dummy variable was 
statistically significant and indicated that targeters narrowed the output gap by about 1  
per cent relative to non-targeters. In the output gap volatility regressions, however, there  
is no significant difference between the performances of targeters and non-targeters.  
These results concur with the empirical literature’s findings for developed countries.  
As Section 2 describes, there is considerable empirical evidence that inflation targeting 
improves economic performance. In the case of developing and emerging countries, however, 
the evidence is less strong. A possible explanation is that several of these countries have 
moved to purely anti-inflation monetary policies based on interest rate rules, which do not 
require explicit announcement of a target value for inflation. Thus they are not formally 
regarded as inflation targeters even though they are acting as such. The main aim of their 
monetary policy is to stabilise inflation, despite the absence of an explicit inflation targeting 
regime. This behaviour makes it difficult to identify change in economic performance resulting 
from the explicit adoption of inflation targeting, because countries regarded as non-targeting 
are also adopting strict anti-inflation monetary policies.7 
As the previous results suggested, the inflation targeting regime caused no harm  
to unemployment in developing and emerging countries. On the contrary, there is some 
evidence that it might have reduced average unemployment relative to non-targeters.  
In addition, it might have narrowed the average output gap for targeters and did not 
negatively affect economic growth. Hence there is no apparent reason to condemn those 
countries for adopting the inflation targeting regime for monetary policy.  
It is important to note that inflation targeting must be accompanied by institutional and 
economic reforms to fiscal and exchange rate policies. Specifically, it requires responsible 
management of fiscal policy because of the implications of the fiscal theory of the price level, 
and a floating exchange rate regime because of the transparency and credibility of the central 
bank’s commitment to keep inflation (and not exchange rate) under control. By paying 
sufficient attention to these issues, the inflation targeting regime is accompanied by 
institutional and economic reforms that are positive for the economy as a whole and  
help improve the country’s economic performance in the long run.  




Ball, L., and N. Sheridan (2005). ‘Does Inflation Targeting Matter?” in B. S. Bernanke and  
M. Woodford (eds), The Inflation Targeting Debate. Chicago, University of Chicago Press for 
NBER, 249–276. 
Bernanke, B. S. et al. (1999). Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Calvo, Guillermo A. and Carmen M. Reinhart (2002). ‘Fear of Floating’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 117, 379–408. 
Corbo, V., O. Landerretche and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). ‘Does Inflation Targeting Make a 
Difference?’ in N. Loayza and R. Soto (eds), Inflation Targeting: Design, Performance, 
Challenges. Santiago, Central Bank of Chile, 221–269.  
Divino, J. A. (2006). ‘Cross Country Evidence on Monetary Policy Rules’. Proceedings of  
the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting 178, ANPEC. 
Divino, J. A. (forthcoming). ‘Optimal Monetary Policy for a Small Open Economy’,  
Economic Modelling. 
Fraga, A., I. Goldfajn and A. Minella (2003). ‘Inflation Targeting in Emerging Market Economies’, 
Central Bank of Brazil Working Paper Series 76. 
Gonçalves, C. E. and J. Salles (forthcoming). ‘Inflation Targeting in Emerging Economies:  
What Do the Data Say?’ Journal of Development Economics. 
Mishkin, F. S. (2004). ‘Can Inflation Targeting Work in Emerging Market Countries?’  
NBER Working Paper 10646. 
Mishkin, F. S. and K. Schimidt-Hebbel (2007). ‘Does Inflation Targeting Make a Difference?’, 
NBER Working Paper 12876. 
Neumann, M. J. M. and J. von Hagen (2001). ‘Does Inflation Targeting Matter?’. 
ZEI Working Paper Series B01. 
Scheater, A., M. R. Stone and M. Zelmer (2000). ‘Adopting Inflation Targeting: Practical Issues 
for Emerging Market Countries’, IMF Occasional Paper 202. Washington, DC, International 
Monetary Fund. 
Woodford, Michael (1994). ‘Monetary Policy and Price Level Determinacy in a Cash-in-Advance 
Economy’, Economic Theory 4, 345–380. 
Woodford, Michael (1995). ‘Price Level Determinacy without Control of a Monetary Aggregate’, 
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2005, 2005, 2005, and 2006, respectively. 
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